Philosophical Writings by P. F. Strawson

Author:P. F. Strawson
Language: eng
Format: epub
Published: 2014-09-01T16:00:00+00:00

II

But we are philosophers as well as men; and so must examine more closely the nature of the realist scheme to which we are pre-theoretically committed and then consider whether we are not rationally constrained, as Locke and Mackie would maintain we are, to modify it quite radically in the light of our knowledge of physics and physiology. Should we not also, as philosophers, consider the question of whether we can rationally maintain any form of realism at all? Perhaps we should; but, as already remarked, that is a question I shall not consider here. My main object, in the present section, is to get a clear view of the main features of our pre-theoretical scheme before considering whether it is defensible, as it stands, or not. I go in a somewhat roundabout way to work.

I have spoken of our pre-theoretical scheme as realist in character. Philosophers who treat of these questions commonly distinguish different forms of realism. So do both Ayer and Mackie. They both mention, at one extreme, a form of realism which Mackie calls ‘naive’ and even ‘very naive’, but which might more appropriately be called ‘confused realism’. A sufferer from confused realism fails to draw any distinction between sensible experiences (or ‘perceptions’) and independently existing things (p.133) (or ‘objects perceived’) but is said (by Mackie expounding Hume) to credit the former with persistent unobserved existence.10 It should be remarked that, if this is an accurate way of describing the naive realist's conception of the matter, he must be very confused indeed, since the expression ‘unobserved’ already implies the distinction which he is said to fail to make. Speaking in his own person, Mackie gives no positive account of the naive realist's view of things, but simply says that there is, historically, in the thought of each of us, a phase in which we fail to make the distinction in question.11 It may indeed be so. The point is one to be referred to the experts on infantile development. But in any case the matter is not here of any consequence. For we are concerned with mature perceptual experience and with the character of the scheme to which those who enjoy such experience are pre-theoretically committed. And it seems to me as certain as anything can be that, as an integral part of that scheme, we distinguish, naturally and unreflectively, between our seeings and hearings and feelings—our perceivings—of objects and the objects we see and hear and feel; and hence quite consistently accept both the interruptedness of the former and the continuance in existence, unobserved, of the latter.

At the opposite extreme from naive realism stands what may be called scientific or Lockian realism. This form of realism credits physical objects only with those of their properties which are mentioned in physical theory and physical explanation, including the causal explanation of our enjoyment of the kind of perceptual experience we in fact enjoy. It has the consequence that we do not, and indeed cannot, perceive objects as they really are.

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